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Economic Perspective 
RAVEHSCRA3G: IN THE fflLTDE POT 
by Jim Love and Jim Stevens 
Department of Economics 
The f u t u r e of the Ravenscraig s t e e l 
complex at Motherwell remains uncertain. 
BSC's views on the future of the UK s tee l 
industry are contained in the new and as 
yet unpublished Corporate Plan. There 
are reasons for believing that the plan 
w i l l a g a i n recommend c l o s u r e of 
Ravenscraig, the most recent guide to BSCs 
thinking being i t s evidence to the House 
of Commons Trade and Industry Committee in 
which they insist on the need to close one 
s tr ip plant in the UK. 
In part, the BSC argument for a reduction 
in s tr ip capacity reflects their forecasts 
of r e l a t ive ly s t a t i c demand in the UK; 
poor prospects for UK and other European 
producers generally in the USA; and poor 
prospects in the Third World markets where 
capacity continues to be expanded and 
where i t i s difficult to compete with the 
J a p a n e s e . P r o s p e c t s for marke t 
penetration are seen as best within the 
protected EEC market. Allied to these 
demand c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i s t h e EEC 
requi rement to achieve commercial 
v i a b i l i t y without s t a t e support by the 
beginning of 1986. This requirement i s 
fully in l i ne with the philosophy of the 
present UK government which has charged 
BSC with the responsibi l i ty of preparing 
the industry for p r iva t i sa t ion . BSC 
maintains that commercial viability cannot 
be achieved with three s tr ip plants. The 
BSC strategy for achieving commercial 
v i ab i l i ty involves shedding loss-making 
export orders, pr incipal ly from Third 
World c o u n t r i e s , and expansion i n to 
European markets. BSC content that only 
two s t r ip mills are necessary to meet the 
demand thus generated. I t should be 
noted tha t there i s no requirement for 
the UK to close a s t r i p mil l as part of 
the EEC strategy of capacity reductions. 
The remaining EEC-imposed cutback of 0.5m 
tonnes of finishing capacity is to be met 
by r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s ou twi th the f ive 
integrated plants. 
In moving from BSCs view of excess s t r i p 
c a p a c i t y t o t he c o n c l u s i o n t h a t 
Ravenscraig i s the l ike ly candidate for 
closure, recent discussion has emphasised 
two points emerging from the evidence to 
the Select Committee: (i) the doubts cast 
by important customers on the consistency 
of q u a l i t y of Ravenscra ig ' s output 
relative to that of Llanwern and European 
suppliers and ( i i ) the lower productivity 
and profitability of Ravenscraig relative 
to Llanwern. Neither point need be 
accepted wi thout ques t ion . While 
customer complaints cannot be ignored, i t 
should be recognised tha t a l l three UK 
s t r i p plants have a large share of the i r 
orders placed on an "insist or preferred" 
basis . Moreover, as BSC r ecogn i se , 
comparisons of performance across plants 
cannot be made without reference to the 
c e n t r a l i s e d " l o a d i n g " p o l i c y . 
Ravenscraig currently undertakes much of 
the l e s s prof i table export orders but, 
given a s imilar loading for each plant , 
Ravenscraig with i t s heavy investment in 
modern technology might exhibit advantages 
over both Welsh plants. 
The implicat ions for Ravenscraig r i s e 
nearer the surface in the Select Committee 
discussion of technology. BSC believe 
59 
t h a t in the long-term s t e e l must be 
cont inuously c a s t . Conversion of 
Llanwern to continuous casting has been 
costed and would i n e v i t a b l y inc rease 
capac i ty a t t h a t p l an t . Increased 
capacity at Llanwern i s consistent with 
t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g BSC view t h a t 
Ravenscraig's location places i t at a 
decisive cost disadvantage. Any such 
investment would have two important 
implications: F i r s t , the EEC would seek 
offsetting capacity reductions elsewhere. 
Secondly, Ravenscraig's present advantages 
in high quality finished products would be 
eroded. 
The case for retaining the third s t r i p 
mil l i s based primarily on questions of 
"second-sourcing" and consumer preference. 
I t i s possible tha t , as with previous 
closures, customers might shift to non-UK 
suppliers reducing demand for the two 
remaining BSC m i l l s . An t i c ipa t ing 
consumer response i s problematic. BSC 
contend that the lessons of previous 
closures have been learned and that the 
loss of market share can be avoided. 
However, i t should be noted that the Welsh 
p l a n t s c a n n o t p r e s e n t l y o f f e r 
Ravenscraig's product range. In addition 
BSC's demand forecasts may be unduly 
pessimist ic . Sufficient gains may be 
made in Europe after the l i f t i n g of EEC 
controls at the end of 1985 to make three 
mi l l s commercially viable. I t may not 
then be wise, as the Select Committee 
argued, to pre-empt this possibility by a 
closure. This argument may be reinforced 
by observing tha t since the present UK 
capacity embodies more modern technology 
than that of most other European producers 
and since UK productivity i s above the EEC 
average, BSC may be wel l placed to 
penetrate more open EEC markets. This 
would be par t icular ly the case if the UK 
government took measures to reduce BSC's 
energy costs to levels s imilar to those 
facing other EEC producers. 
Any strategy for BSC based on expansion 
into European markets depends on the EEC 
dismantling i t s complex system of price 
regulations, production quotas and s ta te 
aid vett ing by the ta rge t date. The 
Select Committee discussion gives the 
clear impression that the UK strategy 
assumes that other countries will make the 
necessary adjustments to capacity and 
s t a t e support. I t i s d i f f i cu l t to be 
other than sceptical about this . Italy, 
West Germany, France and Belgium have done 
much less than the UK over the past three 
years to achieve EEC cutback ta rge ts and 
the French s tee l plan could involve in 
excess of £2,500m in s ta te support up to 
1987. Likely failure to meet EEC targets 
by the end of 1985 make i t d i f f i cu l t to 
forecast market conditions. Given BSC's 
technological lead and uncertainty with 
respect to the nature of the post-1985 
market, an early UK closure may prove 
premature. This i s the essence of the 
Select Committee's case for retention. 
In addition a number of arguments may be 
p r e s s e d in t h e s p e c i f i c case of 
Ravenscraig. F i r s t , BSC may need to 
re ta in Ravenscraig un t i l Port Talbot i s 
f u l l y upgraded and u n t i l any new 
investment i s installed at Llanwern since 
Ravenscraig is presently able to produce a 
range of finished s t r i p products not 
currently available from the two Welsh 
plants. Secondly, there may be a demand 
for Ravenscraig's l iquid s tee l while the 
Redear furnace is relined. Thirdly, and 
very importantly, there i s the argument 
that the social costs of closure in an 
already depressed part of the UK economy 
may exceed the internal savings to BSC. 
The arguments in favour of retaining 
Ravenscraig are somewhat ad hoc but may be 
sufficient in the short-term to avoid 
c l o s u r e . Much depends on the UK 
government's views on achieving viability 
and on the s o c i a l cos t s of c l o s u r e . 
These issues wi l l be c la r i f ied when the 
s t e e l plan emerges from the cur ren t 
d i s c u s s i o n s between BSC and the 
government. But even if a short-term 
future is secured Ravenscraig remains the 
marginal BSC s t r i p mill because of i t s 
l o c a t i o n a l d isadvantage . An ad hoc 
defence wi l l not always be available in 
times of crises. In the longer-term, the 
retention of a steel industry in Scotland 
may require a shift to a different product 
base manufactured at a coastal location. 
